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Case Notes
Equal Protection and the Status of Stereotypes
Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
Miller v. Albright' is a case of missed opportunities. Miller could have
affirmed the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition against gender-based
stereotypes, and it could have extended existing principles to bar
stereotypes that harm other vulnerable groups. Instead, two of three
opinions composing Miller's majority weakened current case law
disfavoring gendered stereotypes and dimmed hopes that similar doctrines
might develop in the future.
I
Lorelyn Miller was born in the Philippines, the daughter of an
unmarried American father and a Filipino mother. After living in her native
country for twenty-two years, Miller moved to Texas, formally established
her father's paternity, and applied for American citizenship. When the State
Department denied her application, Miller filed an equal protection suit
seeking to overturn that decision.
2
The target of Miller's lawsuit, section 309 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act,3 prescribes citizenship standards for foreign-born children
who have one unwed American parent. These standards vary depending on
the American parent's sex. For their children to become citizens, unmarried
Americanfathers must: (1) have resided in the United States for five years;
(2) prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence; (3) promise in writing
to support their offspring until they are eighteen; and (4) formally
acknowledge paternity before their children reach majority.4 Children of
unwed American mothers, however, become citizens at birth if their
1. 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
2. See id. at 1428, 1432-33 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994).
4. See id. §§ 1401(g), 1409(a).
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mothers have been U.S. residents for one year.5 Miller was denied
citizenship because her father acknowledged her only after she had reached
adulthood, and she claimed that this "acknowledgment requirement"
amounted to unconstitutional sex discrimination.6
Three pairs of Supreme Court Justices rejected Miller's claim, offering
three very different reasons for doing so. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, granted Miller standing to challenge the sex
discrimination against her father. But Justice Stevens denied Miller's claim
on the merits, holding that the interests served by section 309 satisfied
intermediate scrutiny and did not rest on gender-based stereotypes. 7 Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, recognized the gendered stereotypes
underlying the government's asserted interests and noted that such interests
could not satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Because Miller herself was not
classified by any suspect criterion, however, Justice O'Connor upheld
section 309 using rational basis scrutiny.8 Justices Scalia and Thomas held
that no court could ever constitutionally grant United States citizenship;
thus, they rejected Miller's claims for lack of standing.
9
II
Although the facts of Miller were too complex to raise any legal
question cleanly, the case may have a lasting impact on equal protection's
approach to governmental stereotyping.10 Equal protection is well-known
as a shield for minorities and fundamental rights and as a sword against
suspect classifications and deliberate discrimination.11 In sex discrimination
5. See id. § 1409(c).
6. Section 309's other requirements were not used to justify the Department's decision; thus,
they were not challenged in Miller.
7. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1436-42 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
8. See iL at 1442-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). According to Justice
O'Connor, Miller's father was the only true victim of sex discrimination. His dismissal from
Miller's lawsuit was not appealed. See idL at 1444 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
9. See id. at 1446-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Because Justice Scalia's opinion
did not reach the merits of Miller's claims, it will not be analyzed here.
10. The Supreme Court has never defined what constitutes a stereotype; nor has it explained
how stereotypes differ from other, noninvidious generalizations. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 161 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Wle can expect to learn from the Court's
[equal protection] jurisprudence in the future which stereotypes the Constitution frowns upon and
which it does not."). In the absence of such definitions, this Case Note wil analyze stereotypes as
they have been described by the Court itself. For the most complete discussions of stereotypes in
equal protection jurisprudence, see Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1449-55 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); and
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541-46 (1996). See also, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42,57, 59 (1992) (forbidding reliance on racial stereotypes in composing a criminal jury).
11. Compare San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-34 (1973) (discussing
"fundamental rights" equal protection), and Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-70 (1976) (expounding a group-based vision of equal
protection), with Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny
to racial classifications per se), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 232, 245 (1976) (requiring
some showing of discriminatory intent to state an equal protection claim).
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cases, however, equal protection serves a third function as well: It discredits
government interests that rely on sex-based stereotypes and excises these
interests and stereotypes from equal protection decisionmaking altogether.
This "anti-stereotype" function of equal protection has not attracted
much academic commentary, 12 but it has been a theme in cases of sex
discrimination, including the landmark decision, United States v.
Virginia.13 In Virginia, the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") argued that
admitting women would destroy its "adversative" method of instruction.
Without directly disputing the State's empirical evidence, the Court noted
that similar testimony had been used in bygone eras to exclude women from
public medical schools, law schools, and military academies. 14 By casting
VMI's interest as one more "scientific" story of female fragility and
weakness, the Court rejected the argument out of hand, holding interests
based on gendered stereotypes inadequate as a matter of constitutional
principle.
15
This doctrinal strategy-which I will call the "anti-stereotype rule"--
marks an important, subtle departure from orthodox constitutional analysis.
Under modern case law, a discriminatory policy should be constitutionally
upheld if any government interest is sufficiently "compelling" and
"tailored" to satisfy appropriate judicial scrutiny.16 The anti-stereotype rule,
12. For a general discussion of "forbidden interest rules" in equal protection jurisprudence,
see Roger Craig Green, Note, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of Judicial
Technique, 108 YALE L.J. 439, 469-72 (1998).
13. 518 U.S. 515 (1996); see also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,725
(1982) ("[I]f the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they
are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is
illegitimate."); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 211 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Such
classifications, however, have frequently been revealed on analysis to rest only upon 'old notions'
and 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations, and so have been found to offend the prohibitions
against denial of equal protection of the law." (citations omitted)); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 645 (1975) ("Obviously, the notion that men are more likely than women to be the
primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical support. But
such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of
women who do work... "').
14. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542-45.
15. See id. at 541 ("State actors controlling gates to opportunity ... may not exclude qualified
individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."'
(quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725)); id. at 541-42 ("[E]qual protection
principles ... mean [that] state actors may not rely on 'overbroad' generalizations to make
'judgments about people that... perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination."' (quoting
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139 n.ll)). The word "overbroad" here should not be confused with standard
intermediate scrutiny. The stereotype at issue in Virginia would be "overbroad" under orthodox
equal protection only if a non-sex-discriminatory policy could serve the asserted interest. By
contrast, the anti-stereotype rule applies even in the absence of such alternative policies. Cf. id. at
585-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (supporting the trial court's finding that any nondiscriminatory
policy would destroy students' "core experience" at VMI: life in common barracks).
16. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235 (defining strict scrutiny to require a compelling
interest that is narrowly tailored to the challenged policy); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985) (defining rational basis scrutiny to require a legitimate,
rationally related interest and intermediate scrutiny to require an important, substantially related
interest).
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however, allows plaintiffs to defeat otherwise satisfactory government
interests without contesting their importance or relatedness. The Court's
scattered statements on the subject suggest that the government cannot rely
on interests-even compelling, narrowly tailored ones-that depend upon
gender-based stereotypes.
17
The doctrinal power to reject gender-stereotyped interests outright,
without applying any tier of scrutiny, enables courts to debunk invidious
sexual generalizations without disputing their empirical validity. The reality
of gender-based stereotypes is that, like most stereotypes, they are
occasionally true. But pre-Miller case law implies that unconstitutional
stereotypes should be overthrown in all circumstances, independent of their
truth or falsehood in particular contexts.
Doctrines like the anti-stereotype rule are especially important given
the modern Court's preoccupation with formally equal treatment for men
and women. 18 Reva Siegel has argued that current judicial rules that
enforce colorblindness and genderblindness fail to disturb, and may actually
reinforce, more subtle forms of oppression. 19 An aggressive anti-stereotype
rule could help remedy this shortcoming. Given that socially dominant
stereotypes disproportionately harm weaker groups, a rule barring all
gender-based stereotypes would allow norms that disempower women to be
successfully attacked without violating principles of formal gender equality.
No Supreme Court decision has ever explicitly justified the anti-
stereotype rule or prescribed its limits. But Justice Stevens's and Justice
O'Connor's Miller opinions suggest that the rule's dynamic potential and
even its doctrinal survival may now be seriously at risk.
Ill
Justice Stevens-one of the anti-stereotype rule's earliest proponents-
implicitly undercut the rule's vitality by failing to apply it to the
government's interests in Miller: (1) establishing proof of parenthood; (2)
17. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541 ('The United States does not challenge any
expert witness estimation on average capacities or preferences of men and women. Instead, the
United States emphasizes that time and again since this Court's turning point decision in Reed v.
Reed, we have cautioned reviewing courts to take a 'hard look' at generalizations or 'tendencies'
of the kind pressed by Virginia ..... (citations omitted)); id. at 542-43 (equating VMI's argument
with other self-fulfilling prophecies used to deny women opportunities, thereby intimating that
this "hard look" is fatal); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139 n.11 ("[G]ender classifications that rest on
impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical support
can be conjured up for the generalization."); id. at 148 (noting that the majority's logic implies an
absolute prohibition against stereotyping) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
201 (1976) (holding that while gendered disparity in drunk driving rates "is not trivial in a
statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for [using] a gender line as a classifying device").
18. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 723.
19. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997).
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promoting relationships between parents and children; and (3) fostering
cultural ties to the United States.20 Although these are certainly legitimate
interests for immigration laws in general, in the context of section 309, each
interest incorporates a stereotyped presumption that females have closer
personal and emotional contact with their children than males do.
21
For example, Justice Stevens found "no doubt that ensuring reliable
proof of a biological relationship between the potential citizen and its
citizen parent is an important governmental objective."22 But do bloodlines
need to be more carefully proven for children with American fathers than
for those with American mothers? In response, Justice Stevens resorted to
stereotypes, asserting that mother-child relationships are "immediately
obvious" because mothers "typically" complete birth records responsibly
and truthfully, while fathers "often" do not.
23
Similarly, with respect to the proffered interests in "encouraging ... a
healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the child" and "fostering
ties between the foreign-born child and the United States," Justice Stevens
assumed that citizen mothers "typically" have custody of their children after
birth while an unmarried father "may not even know that his child exists."
24
Implicitly interpreting section 309 as an "incentive" for parents and
children to bond, Justice Stevens held that such incentives are important for
citizen fathers, who feel little natural connection to their foreign-born
offspring, but are "normally... superfluous" for citizen mothers, who
presumably establish such bonds immediately post partum.
2 5
In recent decades, bombarded by images of deadbeat dads and
struggling single mothers,26 Justice Stevens's gendered assumptions about
parenthood appeal to a maternal mythology that underlies many common
intuitions: Women give birth; thus, it is only natural that they feel a greater
connection to their children. 27 Whether grounded in biology, psychology,
or culture, this claim implicitly assumes that mothers are caregivers who
bond with their children automatically, while fathers become committed
parents voluntarily and contingently, if at all. And even if this
20. Compare Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment), with Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1437-40 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
21. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1461 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1438 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
23. Id. Beyond attacking these generalizations' empirical truth, Justice Breyer argued that
reliable DNA testing and section 309's "clear and convincing evidence" requirement have
rendered the acknowledgment requirement superfluous. See id. at 1461-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. Id at 1439 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
25. Id.
26. See generally Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private
Responsibility and the Public Interest, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 166, 169
(Herma H. Kay & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1990) (noting that recent child support legislation
reveals a general vindictiveness against unwed fathers).
27. This stereotype was also used in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-68 (1983)
(Stevens, J.), to justify discriminatory failure to notify unwed fathers of their children's adoption.
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generalization is plausible, the dispositive question is not whether
.government interests rest on plausible assumptions, but whether they rest
on stereotyped ones.28 Justice Stevens paid lip service to the anti-stereotype
rule, but his Miller opinion leaves one to wonder which stereotypes would
be illegitimate, if those supporting section 309 are acceptable.
IV
Although Justice O'Connor had endorsed the anti-stereotype rule in
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,29 she declined to apply it to
the Miller case. She acknowledged section 309's implicit stereotypes, but
nonetheless she held that such stereotypes are acceptable when they support
a non-sex-based classification. 30 By limiting the anti-stereotype rule to
cases involving intermediate scrutiny, Justice O'Connor undercut the rule's
theoretical basis, and she forestalled its potential to prohibit stereotypes
concerning other marginalized groups, such as homosexuals.
31
By denying Miller standing to raise her father's sex-discrimination
claim, Justice O'Connor confronted a novel legal question. Every anti-
stereotype case before Miller had combined gender-based stereotypes with
a sex-based classification, the latter requiring intermediate scrutiny. Thus,
no court had explicitly decided whether interests incorporating gendered
* stereotypes could pass muster under lower levels of scrutiny.32 Justice
O'Connor decided the issue in three terse sentences, citing Heller v. Doe for
the proposition that "under rational scrutiny, a statute may be defended
based on generaliz[ations] unsupported by empirical evidence."33 This
cursory disposition is especially curious since the Heller Court had
28. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
29. 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
30. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1445-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
31. The link between gender-based stereotypes and stereotypes about other groups first arose
in Craig v. Boren, where evidence that men commit more drunk driving offenses than women was
disregarded, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976), because such generalizations would be
unacceptable as to the drinking tendencies of other "aggregate groups," id. at 209; see also id. at
208-09 n.22 (listing alcoholism rates for Jews, Italian Catholics, and Native Americans).
32. That said, the anti-stereotype rule's application to cases involving rational basis scrutiny
is indirectly supported by Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 211 (1976) (plurality opinion), and
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541-42 (1996). Both of these cases cite decisions that
were decided before sex classifications were accorded intermediate scrutiny and that disfavored
gender-based stereotypes despite applying rational basis scrutiny. Furthermore, there is substantial
evidence that the modem application of intermediate scrutiny to sex classifications emerged from
disapproval of gender-based stereotypes. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976);
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85
(1973); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 641-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). Given this
history, it seems strange for Justice O'Connor now to reject gendered stereotypes only when they
are accompanied by sex-based classifications.
33. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1446 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). Heller concerned involuntary commitment procedures that
applied different burdens of proof to mentally ill and mentally retarded persons.
1890 [Vol. 108:1885
Case Note
unanimously agreed that that case did not involve stereotypes of any kind.3 4
Justice O'Connor's Miller opinion implicitly cabined the anti-
stereotype rule, applying it only to cases that involve both gender-based
stereotypes and gender-based classifications. 35 But as a matter of principle,
the anti-stereotype rule invalidates gendered stereotypes wholesale. Such
stereotypes should not be constitutionally acceptable just because they
support classifications that do not receive heightened scrutiny. For example,
a hypothetical ordinance barring high school students from college
campuses would receive rational basis scrutiny as a classification based on
age.36 If the only interest supporting this policy were protecting immature
high school females from collegiate men, however, then the state's action
would incorporate gender-based stereotypes without using any sex-based
classification.
37
The Court's Virginia decision implies that such a policy, like section
309, would violate the Equal Protection Clause because it used gendered
stereotypes to justify government action. As the Court held in a related
context: "The Constitution cannot control... prejudices but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." 38 By upholding section
309 with government interests that rely on gender-based stereotypes, Justice
O'Connor implicitly sanctioned any gendered stereotype, so long as it is
embodied in a formally gender-neutral policy.
Justice O'Connor's Miller opinion, however, does not merely weaken
the anti-stereotype rule's application to gendered stereotypes. It also
precludes the rule's extension to stereotypes that damage groups currently
receiving rational basis review. Before Miller, gay rights advocates might
have combined arguments from Virginia and Romer v. Evans,39 drawing a
parallel between invidious anti-homosexual "animus" and invidious anti-
homosexual stereotyping.40 Imagine, for example, that a state defended its
same-sex marriage ban by asserting that gay relationships do not embody
the same level of fidelity as heterosexual marriages. Standard equal
protection analysis would require a complex, empirical comparison of
heterosexual marriages and homosexual partnerships, with substantial
34. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 321-30; id. at 346 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
35. Alternatively, Justice O'Connor might have conflated government stereotyping with a
simple absence of empirical support. But that move would strip the anti-stereotype rule of all
significance, since stereotyped interests would be judged on their merits just like any other
interest. Furthermore, such a conflation would contradict language in United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. at 541-42, and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
36. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,314 (1976) (per curiam).
37. The point here is not that the policy should be held invalid, but rather that the government
interest tainted by stereotypes should be formally rejected. The narrow wrong lies in the
government's advancing and a court's accepting a stereotype as constitutionally valid.
38. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984).
39. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
40. For further discussion of this litigation strategy, see Green, supra note 12, at 475-76.
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deference given to any legislative findings of fact. If the anti-stereotype rule
extended to stereotypes against gays, however, such an argument would be
rejected on its face for stereotyping homosexuals as morally suspect and
romantically irresponsible. Such a strategy could provide constitutional
relief without having to raise the general level of scrutiny applied to sexual
orientation discrimination.
If the anti-stereotype rule were applied beyond the bounds of
intermediate scrutiny, it might eventually remove a variety of harmful
stereotypes from constitutional decisionmaking, regardless of the tier of
judicial scrutiny applied. Justice O'Connor's failure to appreciate this
possibility undermined the anti-stereotype rule's basic rationale, and it
curtailed the rule's development in new doctrinal directions.
V
The anti-stereotype rule has always operated in an unstable periphery of
equal protection jurisprudence, but its status after Miller is more uncertain
than ever. Future cases may ignore stereotypes, citing Justice Stevens; they
may accept stereotypes in cases of nonsuspect classifications, citing Justice
O'Connor; or they may do both, limiting the field of cognizable stereotypes
and the operational impact of cognizing them. Since no Miller opinion
collected even a plurality of Justices 4 1 however, hope remains that future
case law will not discard the anti-stereotype rule so carelessly.
As tiered scrutiny becomes increasingly rigid, courts need alternative
tools to close normative gaps left open.42 Because oppressed social groups
are wronged not only by distinctions based on suspect classifications, but
also by governmental use of stereotypes, the anti-stereotype rule serves a
critical constitutional role. The Miller Court missed one opportunity to
excise stereotypes from equal protection jurisprudence, but future courts
should not and need not repeat this mistake.
-Roger Craig Green
41. A Court majority rejected Justice Stevens's interpretation of the anti-stereotype rule, see
Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1445-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1450 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting), and a similar fate may befall Justice O'Connor's approach. Although three
dissenters cited Justice O'Connor's opinion approvingly, see id. at 1450 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting),
they-like Justice O'Connor herself-may have been uniquely unwilling to overthrow stereotypes
in the peculiar context of immigration policy, "an area where Congress frequently must base its
decisions on generalizations about groups of people," id at 1446 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
42. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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